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CUTTING PROVINCIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
RATES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Ergete Ferede† and Bev Dahlby‡
This communiqué is based on the following paper: The Costliest Tax of All: Raising Revenue Through 
Corporate Tax Hikes can be Counter-Productive for the Provinces by Ergete Ferede and Bev Dahlby.
Raising taxes can come at a high cost. Not just to taxpayers, of course, but to 
the economy. Every tax hike naturally leads people or companies to adjust their 
economic activities in ways that result in a reduction in investment, employment 
and economic growth. The loss of income-generating opportunities is the true cost 
of raising tax revenues. Econometric studies clearly demonstrate that corporate 
income taxes are far more sensitive to changes in the provincial tax rates than are 
personal income taxes or general sales taxes and result in greater economic losses 
per dollar of revenue raised. Furthermore, beyond a certain point, raising tax rates 
becomes counterproductive, with the revenue lost due to the negative economic 
effects outweighing any revenue gains through higher rates. In these situations, 
a government can actually raise more revenue by lowering tax rates than by 
increasing them. 
The relationship between tax rates and tax revenues is known as the Laffer curve, 
named after Edward Laffer who famously drew this curve on a napkin in a 
Congressional dining room in Washington to demonstrate how a tax rate reduction 
could raise additional revenues if tax rates exceed a critical level. The Laffer curve 
is usually portrayed as an inverted U shape and if the tax rate exceeds the point 
where tax revenues are a maximum, then a tax rate cut can increase tax revenues. In 
such cases, we say that the government is on the “wrong side” of the Laffer curve.
An analysis of the responsiveness of provincial tax bases to tax rates by Ferede 
and Dahlby (2016) reveals that this has occurred in Saskatchewan. The province 
has raised corporate taxes to a level where it has eroded the corporate tax base 
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1to the point where it has sabotaged the government’s goal of raising more revenue. This 
phenomenon has also occurred in New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, P.E.I., and 
Nova Scotia. In all these provinces, corporate tax rates are so high that lowering the tax rate 
would actually increase the provincial governments’ tax revenues. 
The other five provinces, Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec, have 
sacrificed income-generating opportunities by imposing higher taxes on corporations when 
they could have generated the same amount of revenue through higher sales taxes (or in 
the case of Alberta, a new sales tax). Quebec, at least, has lower tax-base elasticity than the 
others, possibly due to its unique cultural and linguistic characteristics, which may make it 
somewhat less likely for people and investors to leave the province. 
Figure 1 shows the Laffer curves for provincial corporate income tax rates in the 10 
provinces. The vertical axis in these diagrams represents total tax revenues, and not just 
corporate income tax revenues, that would be generated in 2013 in each province. It is not 
drawn to scale because, obviously, Ontario can generate more corporate tax revenues at any 
given tax rate than PEI. The horizontal axis is the provincial corporate income tax rate. For 
each province, we show its actual 2013 corporate tax rate, which generates a certain level of 
tax revenue, denoted as Ract. 
The tax rate that would maximize total tax revenues in a province, denoted as Rmax, has been 
calculated based on estimates of the tax sensitivity of each province’s corporate tax base, the 
size of the base and how changes in the corporate tax rate affect revenues from the provincial 
personal income tax and provincial sales tax in that province.1 In the case of Saskatchewan, 
the revenue maximizing corporate tax rate is 5.7 per cent, whereas its tax rate in 2013 was 
12 per cent. Lowering the corporate tax rate in Saskatchewan to 5.7 per cent would have 
increased total tax revenues in the province. In other words, Saskatchewan was on the wrong 
side—the downward sloping side of its Laffer curve. Figure 1 shows that New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, PEI, and Newfoundland were also on the wrong sides of their Laffer curves.
While the other five provinces were on the upward sloping sections of their Laffer curves 
in 2013, this does not mean that they should increase their corporate tax rates to maximize 
their total tax revenues. At Rmax, the tangent line to the Laffer curve is flat, indicating that a 
tax rate increase generates no additional revenues but it still imposes costs on the economy 
through foregone investment and employment opportunities. Therefore, the cost of raising 
an additional dollar of tax revenue at Rmax is infinitely large. By the same reasoning, the cost 
of raising tax revenue through foregone income-generating activity is inversely related to the 
slope of the tangent line to the Laffer curve. As we move down the Laffer curve and the slope 
of the tangent line increases, the cost of raising additional tax revenues declines because the 
loss of income per additional dollar of tax revenue declines. 
How far down the Laffer curve should the government go by lowering corporate tax rates? 
One goal would be to equalize the marginal cost of raising tax revenues from all sources of 
tax revenue. This would minimize the total cost of raising a given amount of tax revenue for 
the government. 
1 An appendix describing the calculation of the revenue maximizing corporate income tax rates is available from the authors 
upon request. The calculations are based on estimates of tax base elasticities in Ferede and Dahlby (2016) except for Nova 
Scotia where the calculation of the corporate income tax rate that would equalize the marginal cost of public funds from the 
corporate and personal income taxes is based on the estimates in Dahlby and Ferede (2012).
2Since it is difficult to calculate which tax rates would equalize the marginal cost of raising 
revenues across all tax bases, we have considered another goal—lowering the corporate 
income tax rate to the point that the marginal cost of raising tax revenue from the corporate 
tax equals the marginal cost of raising tax revenues from the personal income tax, with any 
reduction in tax revenue made up by increases in provincial sales taxes (from zero in the 
case of Alberta). By equalizing the marginal cost of raising revenues from the corporate and 
personal income taxes, governments would be lowering economic losses from corporate taxes 
while raising the same amount of total tax revenues.
Figure 1 shows the corporate tax rates that would achieve this goal by raising an amount 
of tax revenue denoted as R*. In the case of Saskatchewan, equalizing the marginal cost of 
public funds of the corporate and personal income taxes could be achieved with corporate 
income tax rate of 3.3 per cent. Note that while this would have been an 8.7 percentage 
point tax cut in 2013, the loss of revenue and the necessary sales tax rate increase could be 
relatively small because Saskatchewan was on the downward sloping section of its Laffer 
curve in 2013. For the other smaller provinces, this policy would also involve significant 
cuts to corporate tax rates—from 16 per cent to 5.9 and 4.2 per cent in Nova Scotia and PEI, 
respectively, from 10 per cent to 2.7 per cent in New Brunswick, and from 14 per cent to 3.5 
per cent in Newfoundland. 
In the other five provinces, the corporate tax rate reductions would be more modest, 
especially in the case of Quebec, because the cost of raising personal income taxes in Quebec 
is high and therefore the marginal cost of raising revenue from the corporate income tax 
would still be high, although somewhat lower than the rate in 2013. Corporate tax reductions 
to equalize the marginal cost of public funds of the corporate and personal income taxes 
would also be required in Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba. Only in Ontario would 
this policy not justify a corporate tax rate reduction because its marginal cost of public funds 
from the personal income tax in 2013 was 6.76, higher than the marginal cost of public funds 
from the corporate income tax, 5.21. Therefore in Ontario, the priority for tax reform is lower 
the personal income tax rates.
The corporate tax rate cut consistent with equalizing the marginal cost of raising revenues 
from the corporate and personal income taxes in 2013 in Alberta would have been relatively 
large—the marginal cost of raising personal income taxes was only 1.41 because the province 
had a relatively low 10 per cent marginal personal income tax rate. A large corporate income 
tax rate cut would have been necessary in 2013 to lower the marginal cost of raising revenue 
from the corporate income tax to this level. Since the election of the Notley government and 
the increases in the top personal income tax rate to 15 per cent and the corporate tax rate to 
12 per cent, the marginal cost of public funds from the corporate tax has increased to 3.79 in 
2016 from 2.91 in 2013. The corporate tax rate that would equalize the marginal cost of public 
funds from the corporate and personal income taxes has increased to 7.1 per cent because of 
the increase in the marginal cost of funds from the personal income tax to 1.71 from 1.41 in 
2013. 
Of course, it is not hard to see why politicians may feel political pressure to raise tax rates 
on corporations rather than reduce them because corporations do not vote and the negative 
impact that higher corporate tax rates have on the voters’ standard of living is not directly 
observed, although well documented in econometric studies. But, while taxing corporations 
3may be popular, our economic research indicates that if the goal is to create greater economic 
opportunities for Canadians, the provincial governments should lower provincial corporate 
tax rates and replaced any losses of revenue with higher sales taxes. As politically contentious 
as it may be, the provincial budgets in 2016 should lower the tax burden on corporations and 
replace those revenues with higher sales taxes.
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